{"id":12673,"date":"2025-01-28T11:24:49","date_gmt":"2025-01-28T10:24:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/?p=12673"},"modified":"2025-05-22T09:46:54","modified_gmt":"2025-05-22T07:46:54","slug":"election-campaign-monitoring-media-and-social-media-platforms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/election-campaign-monitoring-media-and-social-media-platforms\/","title":{"rendered":"Election Campaign Monitoring: Media And Social Media Platforms"},"content":{"rendered":"

In October 2024, Local Elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The CA \u201cZasto ne\u201d (\u201cWhy not\u201d) is publishing a series of analyses on how the election campaign looked from the perspective of politicians, the media, and social media platforms.
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Citizens\u2019 Association \u201c<\/span>Zasto ne<\/span><\/a>\u201d (\u201cWhy not\u201d) has been monitoring elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 15 years. Since 2010, <\/span>Istinomjer.ba<\/span><\/a> has been tracking public statements made by public office holders as well as candidates in elections, verifying their truthfulness and consistency. <\/span>Raskrinkavanje.ba<\/span><\/a>, another fact-checking platform operating within this association, has been monitoring factual claims published in the media and on social media platforms since 2017. Throughout these years, the primary focus of these two fact-checking platforms has been political and media accountability.<\/span><\/p>\n

With the advancement of technology and the rise of social media platforms, these platforms have increasingly influenced electoral processes. Therefore, during the pre-election campaign for the 2024 Local Elections, alongside media and political accountability, \u201cZasto ne\u201d also focused on the responsibility of major online platforms. During the pre-election campaign for the 2024 Local Elections, Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje monitored various sources on social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, X, and TikTok in search of disinformation, manipulation, and other harmful content as defined by domestic legislation and the rules of each of these major online platforms. You can read more about the research and methodology in the article titled \u201c<\/span>Elections 2024: How Platforms and Institutions Responded to Harmful Phenomena During the Pre-Election Campaign?<\/span><\/a>\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

The results of the research conducted by \u201cZasto ne\u201d are being published in a series of three articles. This is the second article, which discusses harmful electoral content published on social media platforms by the media and other users. Link to the other articles which discusses how political actors (mis)used social media platforms during the campaign as well as how major online platforms responded to reports of such content, can be found in the main article available at <\/span>this link<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Disinformation In The Election Campaign<\/b><\/p>\n

During the election campaign and immediately after the elections, Raskrinkavanje published 19 fact-checks of various claims made in the media and on social media platforms in the region. In the majority of cases, specifically in 11 analyses, the claims were rated as fake news (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>4<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>5<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>6<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>7<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>8<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>9<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>10<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>11<\/span><\/a>). The content was also classified as manipulation of facts (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>), conspiracy theory (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>), disinformation (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>), clickbait (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>) and spin (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Besides analyzing the accuracy of various claims, Raskrinkavanje also covered a range of other phenomena in the media and on social media platforms during the election campaign. In total, 16 analyses without accuracy ratings were published before and after the elections, addressing issues prohibited either by domestic legislation or by the rules of major online platforms.<\/span><\/p>\n

The evaluated claims most frequently involved discrediting political opponents. A series of false statements were attributed to politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>4<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>5<\/span><\/a>). Such statements attracted significant attention on social media platforms, and this strategy of political discrediting is not new in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The identity of one candidate was also misused to promote a suspicious cryptocurrency trading platform (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Current events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, often disturbing ones, were also used for political conflicts (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>). For instance, after the public learned that the well-known actor Moamer Kasumovic had \u201cbought off\u201d a prison sentence for sexually abusing a minor, some media outlets and social media platforms users baselessly \u201cquestioned\u201d his alleged connections with the SDP party and Banja Luka mayor Drasko Stanivukovic. Similarly, news about the introduction of a \u201csex offender registry\u201d was exploited on social media platforms, with claims that the registry also specified the party affiliation of those listed.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ethno-nationalist narratives were also frequently present in pre-election disinformation (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>4<\/span><\/a>). Based on a real or fabricated support for certain ideas, various false and manipulative claims were created. In this case, the primary goal of such posts was to discredit specific politicians.<\/span><\/p>\n

As in previous election campaigns, in the lead-up to the 2024 elections, fake posters of alleged candidates were circulated (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Disinformation published during the election campaign also covered other current and significant issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the <\/span>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina\u2019s government debt<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>the Sarajevo airport concession<\/span><\/a>, and <\/span>the International Monetary Fund loan<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hate Speech, Biased Reporting, And Manipulation Of Statements<\/b><\/p>\n

A common tool in pre-election manipulation is the misuse of real and fabricated electoral research and public opinion polls. Despite the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina prescribing the correct way to present such research in the media, the campaign for the 2024 Local Elections was full of such examples, from <\/span>falsely attributing research to credible institutions<\/span><\/a> to manipulatively or incompletely presenting survey results (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The campaign was also dominated by cases of instrumentalizing hate speech, homophobia, and misogyny for political purposes. Raskrinkavanje reported on numerous web portals and social media platforms pages that actively conducted a \u201cdirty\u201d campaign of insults, humiliation, and criticism of political opponents (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>4<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>5<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>6<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>7<\/span><\/a>). At the same time, these sources overwhelmingly favored other candidates. In many cases, sources that based their election campaigns on hate speech were completely anonymous.<\/span><\/p>\n

In attempts to discredit a female candidate, misogyny was often present in social media discourse and it was used through insults targeting her physical appearance (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>). Satirical journalistic formats were also used for political criticism during the election campaign (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n

Raskrinkavanje analyzed examples of manipulative and inaccurate representation of party statements (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>). In efforts to deceive readers, some web portals attributed political party statements to the Tuzla Canton Government, while in another instance, such a statement was presented as media reporting. This way, party statements created the illusion of public interest, and the claims within them gained an impression of credibility.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reporting Contrary To The Election Law Provisions In Bosnia And Herzegovina<\/b><\/p>\n

The platform Raskrinkavanje also <\/span>examined<\/span><\/a> the implementation of certain amendments to the Election Law related to the media, imposed in March 2024. A few months before the start of the election campaign, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina <\/span>introduced <\/span><\/a>changes to the Election Law, mandating that online media \u201cthat choose to report on the election campaign\u201d must provide public and transparent information about their ownership. The same decision stipulated that online media covering the election campaign must adhere to the principles of \u201cbalance, equal access, fairness, and impartiality\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the other hand, anonymous web portals in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region have been operating without restrictions for years. Even this decision by the High Representative did not change that situation. Raskrinkavanje\u2019s analysis showed that, despite the new rule, dozens of completely anonymous web portals in Bosnia and Herzegovina actively reported on the election campaign. Not only did they report on the campaign, but they also actively participated in it by spreading hate speech against certain candidates while openly favoring others. <\/span>Raskrinkavanje\u2019s analyses also clearly showed that these web portals did not adhere to the principles of balance or impartiality.<\/b><\/p>\n

The mechanism for enforcing these changes was not defined by the High Representative’s decision. Institutions contacted by Raskrinkavanje also could not clearly explain how this decision would be applied. As the competent body for online media, they referred us to the Press Council (<\/span>VZS<\/b>), but this is a self-regulatory body without real legal authority to impose sanctions. VZS did not respond to a request for comment.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, the monitoring conducted by the Raskrinkavanje platform identified widespread violations of the new provisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Election Law. Meanwhile, the competent institutions remain unable to provide answers regarding its enforcement.<\/span><\/p>\n

Raskrinkavanje\u2019s analysis<\/b><\/a> further showed that some web portals reporting on the campaign, which do not transparently publish ownership information, were also the ones investing the most money in Facebook advertising. <\/b>Two web portals, Banjaluka-24 and Pijemont, which invested the most in advertising during the election campaign, according to data available in Meta\u2019s \u201cAd Library\u201d, were completely anonymous and highly biased. These web portals, which directly violated at least two provisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Election Law, together invested over 10,000 BAM during the campaign month to ensure that their highly unbalanced content, often filled with hate speech, reached the widest audience possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<\/span><\/p>\n

What Else During The Campaign Was Contrary To Social Media Platforms Rules?<\/b><\/p>\n

In addition to factually inaccurate content and other harmful occurrences that can be evaluated based on Raskrinkavanje’s methodology, the researchers of this platform also monitored other types of content deemed harmful under the rules of various social media platforms.<\/span><\/p>\n

Primarily, these included factually inaccurate information that, due to limited reach, popularity, or other reasons, were not evaluated by Raskrinkavanje. The fact that fabricated statements by candidates were among the most popular disinformation content during this campaign is evident from the number of similar examples researchers discovered, beyond those already analyzed. Some of the individuals targeted by such claims were <\/span>Elmedin Konakovic<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Christian Schmidt<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Nermin Niksic<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Kemal Ademovic<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Alma Colo<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Besides fabricating statements about political opponents, social media users also shared numerous other claims and accusations related to election candidates. For instance, Drasko Stanivukovic was accused of <\/span>vote-buying<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>building<\/span><\/a> on \u201csomeone else’s land\u201d without permission, Nebojsa Drinic was accused of extorting caf\u00e9 owners in Banja Luka (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>), Benjamina Karic <\/span>was falsely claimed<\/b> to have <\/span>fled<\/span><\/a> to Belgrade at the beginning of the 1990s war, Fadil Novalic, the former federal prime minister, who was legally sentenced to four years in prison for abuse of office during the COVID-19 pandemic, was falsely portrayed as innocent (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>), and politicians Vlado Djajic, Edin Forto, Drasko Stanivukovic, and Nebojsa Drinic were falsely accused of being drug addicts (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>4<\/span><\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n

Another type of prohibited content on social media platforms, apart from false information, is hate speech, which was frequently used as a tool for discrimination. For example, Benjamina Karic\u2019s physical appearance was mocked in several predominantly misogynistic posts (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n

As previously mentioned, information about Moamer Kasumovic\u2019s confirmed conviction for paedophilia was misused to discredit political opponents during the election campaign. Besides being baselessly linked to the SDP party, which Raskrinkavanje debunked during the campaign, <\/span>similar claims<\/span><\/a> about his alleged ties to the political party Nasa stranka were also spread on social media platforms.<\/span><\/p>\n

Drasko Stanivukovic was also frequently targeted with insults regarding his presumed sexual orientation. In numerous social media platforms posts, primarily on Facebook, he was labelled with derogatory terms and characterized as homosexual (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>3<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>4<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>5<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>6<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>7<\/span><\/a>), and the same accusations were directed at members of <\/span>Nasa stranka<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

No election in our country passes without war-related connotations, therefore the 2024 Local Elections were no exception. Some social media platforms posts compared Drasko Stanivukovic to <\/span>Hitler<\/span><\/a>. On the other hand, Milada Sukalo was subjected to a campaign full of misogyny and hate speech, based on <\/span>false accusations<\/span><\/a> that her father was a war criminal. The basis for these claims was the fact that her father, a candidate in the Banja Luka elections, was a member of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regarding the actors who spread such claims on social media platforms, they were mostly private accounts, often of questionable authenticity. The only notable examples due to their volume of posts were the Instagram page <\/span>Kandzija<\/span><\/a>, which has been known for attacking Drasko Stanivukovic since previous elections, as well as the Facebook pages <\/span>Bosnjacki preporod<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Povjerljivo<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Response Of Very Large Online Platforms<\/b><\/p>\n

How very large online platforms responded to reports of this harmful and prohibited content will be discussed in the next part of this series, in the article titled \u201c<\/span>Monitoring the Election Campaign: Very Large Online Platforms<\/span><\/a>\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

(Marija \u0106osi\u0107 i Emir Zulejhi\u0107)<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In October 2024, Local Elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The CA \u201cZasto ne\u201d (\u201cWhy not\u201d) is publishing a series of analyses on how the election campaign looked from the perspective of politicians, the media, and social media platforms. Citizens\u2019 Association \u201cZasto ne\u201d (\u201cWhy not\u201d) has been monitoring elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina for … Continued<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":12635,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[34,22],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12673","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","category-zasto-ne-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12673","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12673"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12673\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12891,"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12673\/revisions\/12891"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12635"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12673"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12673"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12673"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}