{"id":12676,"date":"2025-01-28T11:24:39","date_gmt":"2025-01-28T10:24:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/?p=12676"},"modified":"2025-05-22T09:47:29","modified_gmt":"2025-05-22T07:47:29","slug":"election-campaign-monitoring-very-large-online-platforms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zastone.ba\/en\/election-campaign-monitoring-very-large-online-platforms\/","title":{"rendered":"Election campaign monitoring: Very large online platforms"},"content":{"rendered":"

In October 2024, Local Elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The CA \u201cZasto ne\u201d (\u201cWhy not\u201d) is publishing a series of analyses on how the election campaign looked from the perspective of politicians, the media, and social media platforms.
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The Citizens’ Association \u201c<\/span>Zasto ne<\/span><\/a>\u201d (\u201cWhy not\u201d) has been monitoring elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 15 years. Since 2010, <\/span>Istinomjer.ba<\/span><\/a> has been tracking public statements made by public office holders as well as election candidates, verifying the truthfulness and consistency of their statements. <\/span>Raskrinkavanje.ba<\/span><\/a>, another fact-checking platform operating within this association, has been monitoring factual claims published in the media and on social media platforms since 2017. Throughout these years, the primary focus of both fact-checking platforms has been political and media accountability.<\/span><\/p>\n

With technological development and the rise of social media platforms popularity, these platforms have taken on an increasingly significant role in electoral processes. Therefore, during the pre-election campaign for the 2024 Local Elections, \u201cZasto ne\u201d focused not only on media and political accountability but also on the responsibility of very large online platforms. During the pre-election campaign for the 2024 Local Elections, Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje monitored various sources on social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, X, and TikTok, searching for disinformation, manipulations, and other harmful content defined by domestic legislation and the rules of these very large online platforms. More details about the research and methodology can be found in the article titled \u201c<\/span>Elections 2024: How did platforms and institutions respond to harmful phenomena during the pre-election campaign?<\/span><\/a>\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

The results of the research conducted by \u201cZasto ne\u201d are published in a series of three articles. This is the third article, which examines how very large online platforms responded to reports of harmful content. Links to other articles discussing how political actors (mis)used social media platforms during the campaign, as well as the harmful electoral content published on social media platforms by media and other users, can be found in the text available at <\/span>this link<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Relevant EU frameworks for the responsibility and transparency of online platforms<\/b><\/p>\n

Since Bosnia and Herzegovina is a <\/span>candidate country for EU membership<\/span><\/a> and is in the process of <\/span>aligning its domestic legislation with European legal and regulatory frameworks<\/span><\/a> regarding the management of online platforms and how they handle harmful and illegal content, we aimed to investigate whether any positive effects of these frameworks are already noticeable and in which areas the biggest shortcomings exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Digital Services Act (DSA)<\/span><\/a> is the overarching legally binding regulation for online platforms, including social media platforms, making responsibility and transparency in handling illegal content a legal obligation within the EU. In the context of elections, relevant procedures include reporting and acting on illegal content, i.e. content that violates domestic electoral laws. In this regard, platforms are required to establish mechanisms that allow any user to report content they consider illegal and to act \u201cwithout undue delay\u201d on each report. This includes sending a confirmation to the user about receiving the report, providing an explanation of the decision regarding the reported content, and offering information on legal remedies available concerning that decision.<\/span><\/p>\n

When discussing harmful content, the DSA obligates very large online platforms and search engines to conduct risk assessments, including actual or foreseeable negative impacts on civic discourse and electoral processes, and to take measures to mitigate such risks. One way to manage risks related to elections is by implementing the <\/span>Guidelines for Reducing Systemic Risks for Electoral Processes<\/span><\/a> and, in the context of spreading electoral disinformation, through the implementation of the <\/span>Code of Practice on Disinformation<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

During monitoring, we examined whether users of very large online platforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina were able to report content that violates the country’s electoral legislation and whether platforms were implementing measures related to harmful content as outlined in the Guidelines and the Code, focusing on the following recommendations:<\/span><\/p>\n