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The Information Environment Under Pressure: Disinformation Trends and Foreign Influence in the 2026 General Elections

Throughout the election period, the Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje platforms continuously monitored the information space in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The monitoring showed that disinformation tactics and techniques observed in previous election cycles largely continued to dominate the information space. New developments compared with previous election cycles included more sophisticated use of artificial intelligence, attacks on new election technologies, and Israel’s emergence as a new actor exerting foreign influence.

Photo by: Zašto ne

General Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held on 4 October 2026. Voters elected members of the Presidency of BiH and representatives to the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of BiH and the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, as well as representatives to the assemblies of the ten cantons in the Federation of BiH. Voters also elected the president and two vice-presidents of Republika Srpska.

These were the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina to use electronic ballot scanners and fingerprint-based voter identification devices.

Election day passed without major incidents that would have jeopardised the conduct of the electoral process. However, international observers recorded certain technical difficulties in using the newly introduced election technologies, concerns about the complexity of some voting and counting procedures, and problems concerning the secrecy of the vote. According to the international OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, despite these shortcomings, election day proceeded in an orderly manner at the polling stations observed.

Denis Bećirović, Darijana Filipović and Željka Cvijanović were elected to the Presidency of BiH, while Savo Minić was elected president of Republika Srpska. SDA and SNSD won the largest numbers of seats in the state and entity parliaments.

The elections were subsequently annulled at one polling station in Bukvik, in Brčko District, due to irregularities in the preparation of voting materials. Voters with Republika Srpska entity citizenship had not been provided with ballots for the election of members of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. Voting at this polling station was repeated on 18 October.

The Central Election Commission of BiH confirmed the final results of the General Elections on 3 November 2026, following the conclusion of proceedings concerning complaints and appeals before the CEC and the Court of BiH. This completed the process of determining the election results and triggered the statutory deadlines for the formation of governments at all levels.

Transparency International BiH (TIBiH) and the “Pod lupom” Coalition announced on 14 November that the CEC had refused “to provide information recorded on identification devices and scanners that could help uncover potential electoral manipulation”. This concerned data on voter turnout by polling station, the number of people who could not be identified using fingerprints, and a list of polling stations where one of the technologies could not be used. TIBiH and “Pod lupom” also requested data on polling stations where discrepancies between electronic and manual vote counts had been observed.

As stated in the article published on TIBiH’s website, “the CEC refused to provide this information, the election results were confirmed, and at the session where the request for access to information was considered, it was stated that the requested data could be misinterpreted”.

Overview of Key Monitoring Findings

Throughout the election period, the Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje platforms continuously monitored the information space in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The monitoring covered the period before, during and immediately after the official campaign, given that election activities, paid political promotion and the publication of manipulative content had begun well before 4 September, when the campaign officially started. In total, more than one hundred pieces of content were produced and published: Raskrinkavanje published 50 analyses of manipulative posts and practices in the media and on social media, while Istinomjer assessed 46 claims made by political actors and published 11 broader analyses.

The monitoring showed that disinformation tactics and techniques observed in previous election cycles largely continued to dominate the information space. Biased reporting, fabricated statements, manipulation of polls and the activities of coordinated bot networks remained the primary tools for discrediting some political actors and promoting others. However, the campaign was also marked by two significant new developments: the first was the emergence of more sophisticated forms of manipulation using artificial intelligence; the second, far more serious, involved systematic attacks on the institution responsible for conducting elections and the spread of unfounded theories about the reliability of new election technologies, aimed at undermining public trust in the electoral process as a whole.

Alongside the blatant disregard for legal prohibitions on election reporting by dozens of anonymous news websites that influenced voters’ choices with impunity, the campaign once again served as an arena for political confrontations over historical and regional issues. Strategic foreign policy objectives, such as BiH’s path towards the European Union, were marginalized and exploited for day-to-day political polarization. At the same time, the public sphere was subject to strong influence from foreign officials and media outlets, primarily those from Serbia, Croatia and Russia, which actively spread anti-Western narratives and ethnic tensions in BiH while also supporting particular parties. Israel also emerged as a distinct new actor in the context of foreign influence. Through official visits to Israel’s top leadership at the height of the campaign, Milorad Dodik exploited international issues to spread dangerous Islamophobic narratives and fabricated terrorist threats through Israeli and regional media, seeking to position Republika Srpska as an exclusive ally in protecting Christian identity.

Dominant Narratives in the Election Campaign

During the campaign for the 2026 General Elections, a significant number of narratives observed in previous election cycles were identified. Particularly prominent among them were nationalist and other polarising narratives that deepened existing social and political divisions, fuelled distrust between different ethnic and political groups, and portrayed political opponents as a threat to the interests of particular communities.

The most prominent new element in the information environment, and the dominant disinformation narrative during the election period, concerned new election technologies. Claims emerged from various parts of the political and media spectrum that electronic ballot scanners and biometric voter identification were too complicated, unreliable and susceptible to manipulation, that they could be hacked or misused, and even that their use could prevent some citizens from exercising their right to vote (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Although the technical implementation, security and reliability of new systems are legitimate subjects for public debate, some media and political discourse moved beyond reporting on specific challenges and developed into the dissemination of unfounded claims and theories about possible manipulation of election results.

This narrative was not confined to the election campaign. Claims questioning the reliability of the new technologies circulated before the elections, on election day, and after voting and the publication of the first preliminary results. Such claims and reporting undermined trust in the integrity of the electoral process and the Central Election Commission of BiH. At the same time, the narrative increased the risk of discouraging citizens from participating in elections and fostering doubts about the purpose and effectiveness of exercising their right to vote.

Another important theme that marked the pre-election period was the funeral of Ratko Mladić, the former commander of the Army of Republika Srpska who was convicted of war crimes. Mladić died on 27 August 2026, shortly before the start of the election campaign, and his death, memorial service and funeral in Belgrade on 5 and 7 September occupied the public and media spotlight for a significant period ahead of the elections. Events surrounding the funeral, the attendance of officials from Serbia and Republika Srpska, and public reactions by political actors created opportunities for the renewed spread of revisionist narratives about the wartime past, the role of the Army of Republika Srpska and the judgments of the Hague Tribunal. Numerous public statements by politicians from Republika Srpska were dominated by the glorification of Mladić and portrayals of his trial as politically motivated, while simultaneously downplaying the crimes for which he had been convicted by a final judgment.

These narratives did not remain outside the election campaign; political actors also used them to attack one another. Candidates and party representatives criticised political opponents for their reactions to Mladić’s death and funeral, whether these involved public expressions of support, messages of condolence or condemnation of his glorification. In this way, attitudes towards the wartime past and individuals convicted of war crimes became part of election campaign communication, further intensifying polarisation.

A significant proportion of political communication during the campaign concerned the presentation of the performance of governments and institutions. The largest number of public claims checked by Istinomjer related precisely to this topic, with political actors frequently exaggerating their own achievements, crediting their parties with results outside their remit, or downplaying the achievements of political opponents. For example, FBiH Prime Minister Nermin Nikšić claimed that all the measures outlined in his inaugural policy statement had been implemented, while Sarajevo Canton Minister of Transpor Adnan Šteta claimed that all SDP promises at the Federation and cantonal levels had been fulfilled, which was inconsistent with the findings of Istinomjer’s monitoring. Bakir Izetbegović, on the other hand, credited SDA with the creation of 120,000 new jobs between 2015 and 2023.

A similar pattern was evident in claims through which politicians sought to discredit opponents or challenge their achievements and political activities. Such claims concerned the work and public activities of individual politicians, the length of time parties had spent in government, the performance of institutions under previous mandates, and the roles and powers of state officials. Unfounded interpretations of court proceedings and judgments were also recorded, including claims about the case of former FBiH Prime Minister Fadil Novalić. This selective presentation of facts shows that verifiable information about the work of institutions and political actors was once again a subject of political competition during this campaign, with data frequently used out of context to substantiate claims of one’s own success or challenge the work of political opponents.

The European Union in the Context of the General Elections

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European path and the reforms necessary to move closer to European Union membership were not among the dominant themes of the campaign for the 2026 General Elections. Monitoring of the information environment indicates that these topics had only a marginal presence in the public sphere, largely confined to declaratory rhetoric and diplomatic meetings, and rarely addressed in concrete election platforms. Shortly before the campaign began, BiH Presidency member Željko Komšić stressed at a meeting with the Head of the EU Delegation to BiH, Luigi Soreca, that there was “no other alternative” to BiH’s European perspective. BiH Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmedin Konaković argued that stagnation on this path created opportunities for malign foreign influence and that membership remained BiH’s strategic objective, while later calling on the European Parliament for stronger EU pressure against domestic obstruction and Russian influence. Chair of the Council of Ministers of BiH Borjana Krišto discussed the Reform Agenda and the problems facing BiH transport operators with Soreca, while Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina Denis Zvizdić assessed that BiH had moved from “European momentum” to a complete standstill.

In the political discourse of parties that declared European integration a strategic objective, statements were often limited to generalities about “European values” and positioning themselves as reliable EU partners. NiP, for example, included this topic in its party manifesto alongside statehood and reforms. HDZ BiH’s candidate for the Presidency of BiH, Darijana Filipović, stated that HDZ was “leading the European path”, that there was no alternative to EU membership, and that “others are calculating”. The election platform of HDZ BiH stated that the party would continue to “lead integration processes” towards EU and NATO membership, while SDP BiH leader Nermin Nikšić said, when presenting the party’s platform, that SDP’s policy at the state level represented “new momentum on the European path”.

Chairman of the Presidency of BiH Denis Bećirović, the candidate of the “United for the State of BiH” coalition, said that full membership remained a strategic objective, but that a European future was impossible alongside the segregation of children and discrimination. Some media outlets criticised these repeated promises, noting that many parties avoided making concrete pre-election promises about membership, while key laws had still not been adopted and a chief negotiator had not been appointed, putting funding under the Growth Plan at risk.

SDA and Naša stranka did not make the European path a focus of their campaigns or offer an accession programme. Naša stranka used the EU as an argument against HDZ BiH and SNSD: Minister of Communications and Transport Edin Forto said that BiH had come to a standstill when “a certain political camp decided to be closer to Moscow than Brussels” and that SNSD and HDZ had a tacit agreement to halt reforms. The party also told Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković that it was difficult to speak about European values while remaining silent about Čović. Forto also referred to the EU in practical terms, as the level at which a solution to the problems facing BiH transport operators should be sought. Commenting on Ratko Mladić’s funeral, Naša stranka president Sabina Ćudić assessed that Marta Kos’s reminder about European values was insufficient and called for sanctions to prevent Serbia from moving closer to the EU. During the campaign, SDA president Bakir Izetbegović linked the EU to messages about protecting Bosniaks, Srebrenica and Ratko Mladić’s funeral. Consequently, the EU appeared in media coverage of SDA indirectly, through disputes over values and the wartime past, rather than through accession negotiations.

On the other hand, SNSD’s rhetoric frequently portrayed the European Union as a threat and incorporated it into broader anti-Western narratives. Following a meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, SNSD leader Milorad Dodik, accompanied by RS Prime Minister and SNSD candidate for RS president Savo Minić, stated that “we feel the evil of Brussels offices every day”.

It is evident that EU-related topics served exclusively as a rhetorical tool in the pre-election period, whether for declaratory positioning, mutual attacks or the demonisation of political opponents, while substantive issues and concrete steps towards membership were almost entirely absent from election platforms.

Foreign Influence in the Campaign

As in previous election cycles, the campaign for the 2026 General Elections took place amid political and media influence from foreign actors, primarily from Serbia and Croatia, but also from the Russian Federation. Foreign officials’ interference in domestic political discourse manifested itself through open and public support for particular political parties and candidates, participation in campaign rallies and other gatherings, and the joint dissemination of anti-Western and polarising narratives that further deepened political and ethnic divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Officials and institutions of the Republic of Serbia and the Russian Federation actively supported the ruling structures in Republika Srpska, primarily SNSD candidates, both directly and through the media. Official visits, such as the Republika Srpska delegation’s trip to Moscow shortly before the elections, and statements by senior Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, created a narrative of a strategic alliance directed against the West. At the same time, Western countries and international institutions, such as the OHR and the European Union, were portrayed as malicious actors exerting political pressure and undermining the entity’s autonomy.

An important context for understanding the intensity of this interference is the fact that snap parliamentary elections in Serbia, scheduled for 25 October, were called at the height of the campaign in BiH. This overlap between the two campaigns resulted in an even stronger presence of Serbian officials and media outlets in BiH’s public sphere. Officials from Serbia participated in final campaign rallies in Republika Srpska, promoting the idea of a “Serbian world” and a unified political space, while political representatives from Croatia, including Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and President Zoran Milanović, openly supported HDZ BiH candidates, repeating narratives about threats to Croats in BiH and the need to ensure “legitimate representation”.

This direct political support was aligned with systematic and biased reporting by Russian state media in the region (RT Balkan, Sputnik and Pravda). Raskrinkavanje’s monitoring revealed a clear pattern in which these news websites completely ignored opposition candidates, while reporting on the statements and activities of SNSD officials regularly, favourably and without critical scrutiny. In line with the rhetoric of the ruling structures in RS, these media outlets served as platforms for spreading distrust in the Central Election Commission of BiH and the newly introduced election technologies. Particularly notable in this context were appearances by actors such as Srđan Mazalica, head of the SNSD parliamentary group, who questioned the reliability of the software and scanners during an appearance on RT, claiming that “only manual counting is credible”. Through Russian news websites, these technical issues were turned into political claims about elections allegedly conducted according to “Schmidt’s recipe”, with only the actions of Western institutions characterised as foreign interference, while Moscow’s involvement was treated as a natural alliance.

In addition, the targeted exploitation of international issues to spread unfounded narratives about security threats and fuel Islamophobia was also recorded. At the height of the election campaign, Milorad Dodik made two official visits to Israel. During the first visit, on 7 September, he met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog, while during the second, on 16 and 17 September, he held talks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Dodik used these meetings to position Republika Srpska as an ally of Israel in confronting fabricated shared threats, building on his earlier claims in Israeli media that “coexistence between Serbs and Muslims in BiH is impossible”. Following the meetings, he made false claims about the return of more than 180 members of the so-called Islamic State to BiH, while this time, in the Jerusalem Post, he accused Bosniaks in Sarajevo of “systemic hatred of Jews”, seeking to portray the entity as a protector of Christian identity. This narrative of a security and terrorist threat emanating from BiH also spread regionally; Željka Cvijanović’s false claim that the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks had held BiH passports was soon repeated in a similar context in the post-election period by Montenegrin MP Milan Knežević, in an attempt to further damage the country’s international reputation.

These examples show the extent to which interference by foreign political and media actors remains a constant in domestic politics. Statements, visits and media campaigns exert a strong and targeted influence on political discourse and the pre-election atmosphere, clearly indicating that electoral processes in BiH do not take place exclusively within its borders. They are strongly influenced by regional and international interests, with these ties most often used to promote polarising narratives that further deepen ethnic divisions and systematically hinder the development of a stable democratic environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Read the comprehensive findings on how foreign actors participated in the campaign and how Russian media reported on the elections in BiH in the detailed analyses by Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje.

Misogyny and the Discrediting of Women Politicians

During the campaign for the 2026 General Elections, Raskrinkavanje recorded numerous examples of sexist and misogynistic content targeting women candidates. Instead of their political work, positions and platforms, some media reports and social media posts focused on the candidates’ physical appearance, clothing and private lives. They were called derogatory names and subjected to sexist accusations and personal attacks, while some posts included explicit calls for violence.

Misogyny was also used as a tool to politically discredit male candidates through derogatory comparisons with women and the casting of male candidates in women’s roles, intended to diminish their political credibility. The instrumentalisation of violence against women in interparty confrontations was also recorded, with the serious problem of violence used as a tool for political point-scoring.

These examples show that women in the political sphere continue to face different and discriminatory standards compared with their male colleagues. The use of gender stereotypes, sexist insults and misogynistic attacks to discredit women political opponents is not only a form of harmful political discourse but can also further marginalise women and discourage their participation in political and public life.

For a detailed overview of examples of these harmful practices in the information environment ahead of the 2026 elections, read Raskrinkavanje’s analysis at this link.

Disinformation and Manipulation Tactics and Techniques in the Campaign

Monitoring by Raskrinkavanje and Istinomjer during the campaign for the 2026 General Elections showed that numerous tactics and techniques for spreading disinformation and manipulating the public, identified in previous election cycles, were repeated this year. These included fabricated statements attributed to candidates, biased reporting by certain news websites (1, 2), promotional interviews with candidates featuring easy and uncritical questions, and the improper presentation or fabrication of polls and public opinion surveys. The fact that Raskrinkavanje recorded similar examples during previous election campaigns points to the frequent recurrence of the same patterns of manipulation.

One new development in this campaign was the sharing of content created or altered using artificial intelligence (AI) for the purpose of political discrediting. Although such examples were neither numerous nor on the scale observed in some other countries (1, 2, 3), cases were identified involving the sharing of AI-generated and manipulated photographs (1, 2), deepfake content, and more subtle forms of manipulation, such as purported AI assessments of election results presented as relevant forecasts. These cases indicate an expanding repertoire of manipulative techniques and new challenges for citizens in verifying the authenticity of content.

A significant proportion of manipulation also spread through coordinated networks of social media accounts and pages. Facebook pages publishing identical content to promote particular political parties and candidates and discredit their opponents were identified, as were cases in which posts by anonymous profiles were subsequently reproduced by media outlets, including public media in Republika Srpska.

Particularly significant were examples of bot networks and other suspicious profiles in Facebook comments (1, 2). Groups of accounts posting large numbers of very similar, predominantly positive comments were identified on the pages of political parties and candidates. Such coordinated activity created an artificial impression of broad support for these candidates and parties. These networks seek to shape perceptions of public opinion, increase the visibility of political messages, and make coordinated, inauthentic support appear to be a spontaneous response from large numbers of citizens.

Taken as a whole, one of the most important conclusions of the monitoring is that discrediting political opponents was the dominant objective of a large number of the recorded instances of manipulation. From fabricated statements and biased reporting to AI-generated content and coordinated account networks, various techniques were used to damage the reputations of individual candidates and create a negative image of their political activities, sometimes while simultaneously promoting their opponents. Although new tools and methods for producing manipulative content with the assistance of artificial intelligence emerged, the basic patterns of political disinformation remained largely unchanged.

Anonymous News Websites Once Again Reported on Elections in Defiance of the Election Law

During the campaign for the 2026 General Elections, Raskrinkavanje once again recorded widespread violations of the Election Law in reporting by anonymous news websites. The same practice was recorded in the two previous election cycles, following the introduction of a ban on election reporting by news websites without transparent ownership (1, 2).

Specifically, amendments to the Election Law imposed by the OHR in March 2024 stipulated that online media reporting on election campaigns must provide public and transparent information about their ownership. However, according to Raskrinkavanje’s analysis, more than 50 anonymous news websites actively reported on this year’s campaign despite failing to meet the legal requirement for ownership transparency.

Some anonymous news websites did not merely report on the elections but actively participated in the campaign, openly favouring particular candidates and parties while seeking to discredit others. They also published election-related disinformation and manipulative content. In doing so, in addition to violating transparency provisions, these websites also called into question the legally prescribed principles of balance, equal access, fairness and impartiality in election reporting.

Although this was the third consecutive election campaign during which such violations of the Election Law were documented, this article of the Election Law remains unenforced. The problem lies in imprecisely defined responsibilities and the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. With the Central Election Commission and the Communications Regulatory Agency not recognising jurisdiction over online media, and the Press and Online Media Council operating as a self-regulatory body without the power to impose sanctions, the legal provisions remain unenforced in practice. Consequently, anonymous news websites continue to participate actively in election campaigns without transparency or accountability for their reporting.

Read the detailed analysis of this phenomenon on Raskrinkavanje at this link.

Monitoring Once Again Highlighted the Need to Strengthen Electoral Integrity

As monitoring of the information environment showed, the 2026 General Elections exposed systemic shortcomings in preparing for and safeguarding the electoral process in the digital environment. Widespread and largely unpunished violations of the law by anonymous news websites, as well as political and media actors, demonstrated that the existing legislative framework is insufficient and ineffective without broader systemic approaches and greater institutional capacity.

The unchecked spread of disinformation and the activities of coordinated networks on social media confirmed a critical lack of functional channels for communication and escalation of issues with very large online platforms (VLOPs), which once again played a key role in enabling threats to electoral integrity. Although these platforms also have their own rules concerning content and actors, this monitoring once again showed that those rules are not enforced, a direct consequence of the absence of laws requiring them to do so.

Protecting electoral integrity in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be an exclusively domestic matter but must become part of broader European efforts to strengthen democratic resilience and counter foreign influence. As a candidate country, BiH must engage more actively in initiatives such as the European Democracy Shield and establish stronger cooperation between state institutions, civil society and the media and the relevant European Union bodies. Building domestic capacity, regulating the information space through legislation and establishing functional cooperation with very large online platforms are tasks that must begin immediately, so that institutions and society enter the next election cycle with adequate mechanisms to defend electoral integrity.

(Dalio Sijah, Emir Zulejhić, Marija Ćosić and Rašid Krupalija)