Awaiting the European Democracy Shield: What Does This EU Initiative Mean for the Region?
In November 2025, the European Commission presented two initiatives: the European Democracy Shield and the EU Strategy for Civil Society. Among other objectives, this package aims to strengthen information integrity in Europe, with a focus on combating disinformation and electoral manipulation. Many of the proposed measures are expected to apply to candidate and potential candidate countries as well.
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The European Democracy Shield (EDS) has been proposed in the context of increasingly complex challenges facing European democracy. Its swift adoption was also called for by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the European Union address. As stated in the Commission’s communication, democratic systems are exposed to strong internal and external pressures amid growing political polarization, regional and international conflicts, and rapid technological change. Foreign interference in electoral processes, information manipulation, the targeted spread of false or misleading content via social media, and cyberattacks undermine citizens’ trust in institutions and constrain the work of independent media and civil society, thereby calling into question the fundamental values on which the European Union is built.
The European Union plans to provide a comprehensive response to these challenges through the three pillars underpinning the EDS: protecting the integrity of the information space; strengthening democratic institutions, free and fair elections, and free and independent media; and reinforcing democratic resilience and civic participation.
Particular attention has been given to risks stemming from digital transformation, namely the fact that digital technologies, especially online platforms, can be misused to spread disinformation, manipulate public opinion, and undermine electoral processes. The EDS therefore enhances coordination among EU institutions, Member States, and relevant stakeholders to enable early detection of and response to systemic risks. It also builds on existing regulatory frameworks, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA), to ensure greater accountability of digital platforms, increased algorithmic transparency, and the protection of fundamental rights in the online space.
For instance, the European Commission will develop a DSA incidents and crisis protocol to facilitate rapid information exchange between online platforms and Member States and enable timely and effective responses to organized attempts at information manipulation. Strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation and intensifying monitoring of its implementation has also been announced, particularly with regard to platforms’ obligations concerning transparency of algorithmic recommender systems and the demonetization of disinformation. The need to reinforce the election-related provisions of the Code has also been emphasized, especially through mechanisms that would enable civil society organizations to quickly report content or accounts posing a threat to electoral processes (the so-called Rapid Response System). The EDS also foresees new mechanisms within the Code aimed at mapping and analyzing emerging and future threats related to information manipulation campaigns during electoral periods.
What Could the EDS Bring to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Other Western Balkan Countries?
The proposed text of the European Democracy Shield recognizes the close links between the EU’s information space and that of candidate countries, placing strong emphasis on mutual cooperation and greater alignment between the EU’s internal and external actions in these areas. In particular, the European Commission highlights its intention to intensify efforts, through EDS mechanisms, to combat Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) beyond EU borders.
Although more detailed information on concrete support for candidate countries is still lacking, it is encouraging that they are mentioned multiple times throughout the document. Moreover, in the draft report of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield, the Commission is called upon to be even more ambitious and determined in implementing the proposed measures, both within the EU and in its neighborhood.
The EDS envisages several important mechanisms explicitly open to candidate countries. One of the most significant is the Centre for Democratic Resilience, which is intended to bring together expertise, resources, and existing EU and national networks and structures to facilitate information exchange and strengthen capacity to address shared threats, particularly FIMI and disinformation. Within this Centre, a Stakeholder Platform will be established to facilitate dialogue and the exchange of information, research findings, and other resources among civil society organizations, researchers, academia, media, and fact-checking organizations.
The mandate of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) will be expanded and its capacities strengthened to enable monitoring and analysis of disinformation campaigns, particularly during elections and crisis situations. This monitoring will also cover candidate and potential candidate countries. The EU has already supported the establishment of a new EDMO regional hub for Ukraine and Moldova.
The European Democracy Shield could also open the possibility of establishing an EDMO regional hub for the Western Balkans, enabling systematic monitoring and analysis of disinformation in local languages and within the specific regional context. It would also strengthen the capacities of local actors – researchers, fact-checkers, media, and civil society organizations; through shared methodologies, data exchange, training, and access to EU tools and standards.
Another envisaged mechanism is the European Fact-Checking Network, also open to candidate countries and other neighboring countries participating in the Digital Europe Programme. The network would provide support and capacity-building for independent fact-checking organizations, including protection against threats and harassment. Among other measures, it would establish a database enabling journalists, platforms, researchers, and civil society to quickly access verified information, particularly during elections and crisis situations.
Support for independent journalism and media literacy, which is also open to candidate countries, would be provided through the Media Resilience Programme. This programme will connect existing media support with new funding programmes under the proposed “AgoraEU” programme for culture, media, and civil society.
Finally, the European Commission proposes stronger and more systematic inclusion of electoral bodies from candidate countries in the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE).
Strengthening Civil Society
Candidate countries are also expected to be covered by the Strategy for Civil Society. The Strategy foresees strengthened cooperation with civil society, including various forms of support aimed at protecting civil society – for example, training for the judiciary on SLAPP lawsuits targeting civil society organizations. Measures to ensure long-term financial support for the sector and improved coordination of dialogue with donors are also envisaged.
One of the first measures the Commission plans to implement this year is the establishment of a Civil Society Platform to provide a framework for cooperation with civil society organizations and their participation in governance and policymaking processes in areas related to democratic values, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental freedoms. The Strategy explicitly states that candidate countries will be integrated into all envisioned measures and activities in a manner similar to EU country members. Civil society is highlighted as crucial in the EU accession process, and activities are foreseen to “institutionalize and standardize” consultations with civil society at national levels.
The concrete measures and structures envisaged under the EDS will be introduced gradually over the course of this and the upcoming year. At least at the declaratory level, the EU intends to include its neighboring countries in several key measures under this initiative. According to Commissioner Michael McGrath, “candidate and potential candidate countries will not stand on the sidelines – they will be key partners in the actions we take”.
Civil society within the EU, as well as from candidate countries, is already actively involved in shaping the EDS, which is entering its final phase. The Citizens’ Association “Why Not” participated in drafting civil society recommendations for an effective European Democracy Shield and in shaping amendments to the report of the European Parliament’s Special Committee, whose adoption is expected in the near future.
Next Steps
In its draft report, the parliamentary committee on the EDS emphasizes the partnership role of countries from the EU’s “neighborhood” within the Shield framework. It notes that the Western Balkans, Moldova, and Ukraine face serious foreign interference and calls for funding of regional coordination centers to counter FIMI, strengthened support for investigative journalism and media regulators, and assistance to candidate countries in safeguarding electoral integrity.
Whether and to what extent these mechanisms and measures will achieve their ambitious goals remains to be seen in the months and years ahead. In candidate countries, EU support and engagement must be continuous and systemic rather than based on one-off interventions. As an example of election-related support, reference is often made to the stress test conducted by the European Commission, together with national institutions, ahead of the 2024 presidential elections and referendum in Moldova. At the Commission’s request, major online platforms – Google, Meta, TikTok, and Microsoft, agreed to implement temporary mechanisms to prevent electoral manipulation, including cooperation with fact-checking organizations and the establishment of dedicated escalation channels for content that threatens electoral integrity.
However, accountability and transparency mechanisms for large online platforms need to be established on a permanent basis, and the EDS could provide the framework for such an approach. This would entail supporting alignment of countries in the region with EU digital regulation, developing institutional and professional capacities for its implementation, and gradually integrating them into European enforcement and oversight mechanisms.
The instruments introduced by the EDS create significant opportunities for institutions, regulatory bodies, media, and civil society organizations in the region. These opportunities, however, require active engagement, clearly expressed interest, and the launch of initiatives at both national and regional levels. The first step involves active participation in the networks, programmes, and mechanisms developed by the EU, making use of available resources to strengthen domestic expertise, and seizing the opportunity for the region to contribute to policymaking at the European level. At the same time, it is important to more strongly and coherently advocate for the consistent implementation of European Democracy Shield measures in the region.