Election Campaign Monitoring: Candidates And Social Media Platforms

In October 2024, Local Elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The CA “Zasto ne” (“Why not”) is publishing a series of analyses on how the election campaign looked from the perspective of politicians, the media, and social media platforms.

Citizens’ Association “Zasto ne” (“Why not”) has been monitoring elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 15 years. Since 2010, Istinomjer.ba has been tracking public statements made by officeholders and election candidates, verifying their truthfulness and consistency. Raskrinkavanje.ba, another fact-checking platform operating within the association, has been monitoring factual claims published in the media and on social media platforms since 2017. Over the years, the primary focus of these two fact-checking platforms has been political and media accountability.

With technological advancements and the growing popularity of social media platforms, these platforms play an increasing role in electoral processes. Therefore, during the pre-election campaign for the 2024 Local Elections, the Citizens’ Association “Zasto ne” expanded its focus beyond media and political accountability to include the responsibility of major online platforms. Throughout the campaign, Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje monitored various sources on social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, X, and TikTok, searching for disinformation, manipulations, and other harmful content defined by local legislation and the policies of these major platforms. More details on the research and methodology can be found in the article “Elections 2024: How Did Platforms and Institutions Respond to Harmful Phenomena During the Pre-Election Campaign?”

“Zasto ne” is publishing the research findings in a three-part series. This is the first article and it examines how political actors (mis)used social media platforms during the campaign. Links to other articles, which discuss harmful electoral content shared by the media and other users on social media platforms, as well as how major online platforms responded to reports of such content, can be found in the main article available at this link.

Premature Campaigning And Imposed Changes To The Election Law

Premature election campaigning is a form of manipulation long prohibited by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Election Law, yet it remains one of the most common violations in the electoral process. Raskrinkavanje and Istinomjer have recorded numerous breaches of the ban on premature campaigning in previous election cycles, with the biggest issue being the lack of penalties for these violations, as the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CIK BiH) had declared itself incompetent to regulate social media platforms violations.

Amendments to the Election Law of BiH, imposed by High Representative Christian Schmidt on March 26, 2024, expanded the definition of premature campaigning to include “conducting an election campaign from the moment elections are announced until the official start of the campaign”. Premature political campaigning was explicitly defined as any campaign conducted through electronic, online, or print media, social media platforms, or any form of public advertising. These amendments clarified the period during which campaigning is prohibited and extended legislative oversight to social media platforms. As a result, CIK BiH became responsible for regulating social media platforms violations, one of the most frequent forms of premature campaigning, and began issuing fines.

As Istinomjer thoroughly analyzed in an analysis from late September 2024, CIK BiH began imposing fines based on this legal basis back in June 2024. Numerous fines were issued to political entities, including parties such as DNS, Nasa stranka, NiP, SDA, HDZ BiH, SNSD, SDS, Ujedinjena Srpska, Mozemo bolje, PDP, Snaga naroda, SDP BiH, Laburisticka stranka, Stranka za BiH, Demos, HDZ 1990, BOSS, and others. According to the published report, CIK received 607 complaints regarding premature election campaigning, most of which concerned Facebook posts, indicating widespread violations.

The imposed amendments to the Election Law also prohibit political entities from spreading false information through the media that could undermine the integrity of the electoral process and mislead voters. CIK BiH has been authorized to act in cases of such violations. During the election campaign, Istinomjer contacted CIK to inquire whether they had issued fines for spreading false news in addition to premature campaigning. In a phone call, CIK representatives stated that they had not received complaints regarding false news from candidates. They also clarified that CIK BiH is only responsible for disinformation directly related to the electoral process, not for other types of disinformation, although the legal basis for this interpretation remains unclear. It is evident that the ban on spreading false information has had no practical effect.

False Statements About Socioeconomic Indicators As A Tool For Discrediting Opponents

Aside from violations related to premature campaigning, false statements made by candidates were the second most common form of manipulation during elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the campaign for the 2024 Local Elections, Istinomjer analyzed 21 public statements made by representatives of various political parties running for office.

Among the analyzed claims, 12 were rated as false (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12), four received “unfounded” rating (1, 2, 3, 4), three were mostly false (1, 2, 3), and one was partially true (1).

In most cases, political candidates either exaggerated their achievements or made false claims about their opponents’ work. Many of these statements centred around economic and social issues.

Candidates made misleading claims about debt repayments (1), GDP growth (1), the number of fiscal cash registers and tax collection (1, 2), as well as project implementation during their mandates(1). Project implementation was also used to discredit political opponents, along with topics such as public debt, electricity imports (1), EU funding (1), and the allocation of financial aid from the FBiH government during the COVID-19 pandemic (1). False data were also presented regarding unemployment (1), employment rates (1) as well as declines in employment (1, 2). 

Beyond economic and social indicators, Istinomjer analyzed a range of other claims. For example, the candidate for mayor of Novo Sarajevo, Nedzad Koldzo, falsely claimed on Facebook that Croatian singer Severina would earn 400,000 KM per hour for her New Year’s Eve performance in Sarajevo.

False claims were also made regarding the distribution of free textbooks (1), public transportation (1), the number of young candidates on party lists (1), mayoral terms in the U.S. (1), and the future Ars Aevi Museum of Contemporary Art in Sarajevo (1). 

More false claims related to the Mostar mayoral elections were covered in the analysis “There Are No Candidates for Mayor in Mostar Elections”.

Hate Symbols And Prohibited Gifts

In addition to false claims by candidates, Istinomjer recorded several other negative and prohibited practices, such as the distribution of gifts in the name of political parties and the glorification of fascist symbols on social media platforms.

Bribery in elections or voting is prohibited by the criminal laws of the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska. However, the movement “Uspjesna Srpska” posted a video on its Facebook page showing aid being distributed to residents of Bijeljina neighbourhoods on behalf of the party during the campaign.

Hate speech and the glorification of fascist symbols are not only prohibited by local legislation but also by the policies of all major online platforms. Nevertheless, in commemoration of the 33rd anniversary of the assassination of Croatian politician Ante Paradzik, HSP BiH repeatedly posted visuals featuring the Ustasha salute “Za dom spremni” on its Facebook pages. This slogan, along with the unconstitutional NDH coat of arms, appeared in other promotional posts by the party (1, 2, 3, 4). 

Additionally, in what could be considered hate speech, Srdjan Mandic, mayor of Centar Sarajevo, wrote in a Facebook post during a cleanup campaign that the action was meant to “clean up a dump and a nest of drug addicts and migrants”. After several edits, the controversial part was removed from the post.

Failure To Regulate Manipulation Of Candidacies

In addition to the harmful practices that are prohibited either by domestic laws or by the policies of major online platforms, there are also evident manipulations employed by political entities that are neither regulated by any legal provisions nor explicitly banned. One such practice, particularly prominent in Local Elections, is the manipulation of candidacies.

As many as 90 state, entity, or cantonal representatives decided to run in the Local Elections, despite already representing citizens at higher levels of government, where they receive significantly higher salaries than they would in city and municipal councils. Among the candidates were well-known officials who had been shaping their political careers for years through various levels of government, including party leaders such as Nenad Stevandic (Ujedinjena Srpska), Nebojsa Vukanovic (Za pravdu i red), Branislav Borenovic (PDP), and Ilija Cvitanovic (HDZ 1990).

Out of a total of 83 members of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska (NSRS), as many as 32 were candidates for city and municipal councils. Along with candidates for mayors and municipal heads, this number reached 41, leading to the conclusion that half of the NSRS manipulated voters by running in general and local elections. Istinomjer extensively covered this topic during the campaign.

Response Of Very Large Online Platforms

How very large online platforms responded to reports of this harmful and prohibited content will be discussed in the next part of this series, in the article titled “Monitoring the Election Campaign: Very Large Online Platforms”.

 

(Dalio Sijah)